Static benchmarks fail to capture LLM vulnerabilities emerging through community experimentation in online forums. We present PrompTrend, a system that collects vulnerability data across platforms and evaluates them using multidimensional scoring, with an architecture designed for scalable monitoring. Cross-sectional analysis of 198 vulnerabilities collected from online communities over a five-month period (January-May 2025) and tested on nine commercial models reveals that advanced capabilities correlate with increased vulnerability in some architectures, psychological attacks significantly outperform technical exploits, and platform dynamics shape attack effectiveness with measurable model-specific patterns. The PrompTrend Vulnerability Assessment Framework achieves 78% classification accuracy while revealing limited cross-model transferability, demonstrating that effective LLM security requires comprehensive socio-technical monitoring beyond traditional periodic assessment. Our findings challenge the assumption that capability advancement improves security and establish community-driven psychological manipulation as the dominant threat vector for current language models.

Large Language Model (LLM) agents face security vulnerabilities spanning AI-specific and traditional software domains, yet current research addresses these separately. This study bridges this gap through comparative evaluation of Function Calling architecture and Model Context Protocol (MCP) deployment paradigms using a unified threat classification framework. We tested 3,250 attack scenarios across seven language models, evaluating simple, composed, and chained attacks targeting both AI-specific threats (prompt injection) and software vulnerabilities (JSON injection, denial-of-service). Function Calling showed higher overall attack success rates (73.5% vs 62.59% for MCP), with greater system-centric vulnerability while MCP exhibited increased LLM-centric exposure. Attack complexity dramatically amplified effectiveness, with chained attacks achieving 91-96% success rates. Counterintuitively, advanced reasoning models demonstrated higher exploitability despite better threat detection. Results demonstrate that architectural choices fundamentally reshape threat landscapes. This work establishes methodological foundations for cross-domain LLM agent security assessment and provides evidence-based guidance for secure deployment. Code and experimental materials are available at https: // github. com/ theconsciouslab-ai/llm-agent-security.

Real-world adversarial physical patches were shown to be successful in compromising state-of-the-art models in a variety of computer vision applications. Existing defenses that are based on either input gradient or features analysis have been compromised by recent GAN-based attacks that generate naturalistic patches. In this paper, we propose Jedi, a new defense against adversarial patches that is resilient to realistic patch attacks. Jedi tackles the patch localization problem from an information theory perspective; leverages two new ideas: (1) it improves the identification of potential patch regions using entropy analysis: we show that the entropy of adversarial patches is high, even in naturalistic patches; and (2) it improves the localization of adversarial patches, using an autoencoder that is able to complete patch regions from high entropy kernels. Jedi achieves high-precision adversarial patch localization, which we show is critical to successfully repair the images. Since Jedi relies on an input entropy analysis, it is model-agnostic, and can be applied on pre-trained off-the-shelf models without changes to the training or inference of the protected models. Jedi detects on average 90% of adversarial patches across different benchmarks and recovers up to 94% of successful patch attacks (Compared to 75% and 65% for LGS and Jujutsu, respectively).

This work is done as part of a research master's thesis project. The goal is to generate SPARQL queries based on user-supplied keywords to query RDF graphs. To do this, we first transformed the input ontology into an RDF graph that reflects the semantics represented in the ontology. Subsequently, we stored this RDF graph in the Neo4j graphical database to ensure efficient and persistent management of RDF data. At the time of the interrogation, we studied the different possible and desired interpretations of the request originally made by the user. We have also proposed to carry out a sort of transformation between the two query languages SPARQL and Cypher, which is specific to Neo4j. This allows us to implement the architecture of our system over a wide variety of BD-RDFs providing their query languages, without changing any of the other components of the system. Finally, we tested and evaluated our tool using different test bases, and it turned out that our tool is comprehensive, effective, and powerful enough.